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In this article we consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with diﬀerentiated products.
We assume that the demand system is Shubik’s (1980) and that ﬁrms operate at a
constant and identical marginal and average cost. First, we show that the  and -
characteristic functions (Aumann 1959) lead to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games and we prove that the convexity property holds for this class of games.
Then, following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we consider the -characteristic func-
tion where ﬁrms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply
strategies. For this class of games, we show that the Equal Division Solution be-
longs to the core and we provide a suﬃcient condition under which such games are
convex.
Keywords: Bertrand oligopoly TU-games; Core; Convexity; Equal Division Solution
JEL Classiﬁcations: C71, D43
1 Introduction
Usually, oligopoly situations are modeled by means of non-cooperative games. Every
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm pursues Nash strategies and the resulting outcome is not Pareto
optimal. Yet, it is known that ﬁrms are better oﬀ by forming cartels and that Pareto
eﬃciency is achieved when all the ﬁrms merge together. A problem faced by the members
of a cartel is the stability of the agreement and non-cooperative game theory predicts
that member ﬁrms have always an incentive to deviate from the agreed-upon decision.
However, in some oligopoly situations ﬁrms don’t always behave non-cooperatively
and if suﬃcient communication is feasible it may be possible for ﬁrms to sign agreements.
A question is then whether it is possible for ﬁrms to agree all together and coordinate their
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0decision to achieve Pareto eﬃciency. For that, a cooperative approach for oligopoly situ-
ations can be considered by converting the normal form oligopoly game into an oligopoly
TU-game in which ﬁrms can form cartels acting as a single player. Since every individual
proﬁt function depends on each ﬁrm’s decision, the proﬁt of a cartel depends on out-
siders’ behavior. Hence, the determination of the proﬁt that a cartel can obtain requires
to specify how the other ﬁrms react. Aumann (1959) proposes two approaches: according
to the ﬁrst, every cartel computes the total proﬁt which it can guarantee itself regardless
of what outsiders do; the second approach consists in computing the minimal proﬁt for
which outsiders can prevent the ﬁrms in the cartel from getting more. These two assump-
tions lead to consider the  and -characteristic functions respectively. However, these
two approaches can be questioned since outsiders probably cause substantial damages
upon themselves by minimizing the proﬁt of the cartel. This is why Chander and Tulkens
(1997) propose to consider an alternative blocking rule where external ﬁrms choose their
strategy individually as a best reply to the coalitional action. This leads to consider the
"partial agreement characteristic function" or, for short, the -characteristic function.
Until now, many works have dealt with Cournot oligopoly TU-games. With or with-
out transferable technologies,1 Zhao (1999a,b) shows that the  and -characteristic
functions lead to the same class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games. When technologies
are transferable, Zhao (1999a) provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition to establish
the convexity property in case the inverse demand function and cost functions are linear.
Although these games may fail to be convex in general, Norde et al. (2002) show they
are nevertheless totally balanced. When technologies are not transferable, Zhao (1999b)
proves that the core of such games is non-empty if every individual proﬁt function is
continuous and concave.2 Furthermore, Norde et al. (2002) show that these games are
convex in case the inverse demand function and cost functions are linear, and Driessen
and Meinhardt (2005) provide economically meaningful suﬃcient conditions to guarantee
the convexity property in a more general case.
For the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form, Lardon
(2009) shows that the diﬀerentiability of the inverse demand function ensures that these
games are well-deﬁned and provides two core existence results. The ﬁrst result establishes
that such games are balanced, and therefore have a non-empty core, if every individual
proﬁt function is concave. When cost functions are linear, the second result provides a
single-valued allocation rule in the core, called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value, which is charac-
terized by four axioms: eﬃciency, null ﬁrm, monotonicity and non-cooperative fairness.3
In continuation of this work, Lardon (2010) shows that if the inverse demand function
is continuous but not necessarily diﬀerentiable, it is always possible to deﬁne a Cournot
1We refer to Norde et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of this distinction.
2Zhao shows that the core is non-empty for general TU-games in -characteristic function form in
which every strategy set is compact and convex, every utility function is continuous and concave, and
satisfying the strong separability condition that requires that the utility function of a coalition and each of
its members’ utility functions have the same minimizers. Zhao proves that Cournot oligopoly TU-games
satisfy this latter condition.








































0oligopoly interval game4 in -characteristic function form. This class of Cournot oligopoly
interval games includes the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic func-
tion form. Lardon considers two extensions of the core, the interval core and the standard
core, and provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the non-emptiness of each of
these core solution concepts.
Unfortunately, few works have dealt with Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. Kaneko
(1978) considers a Bertrand oligopoly situation where a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms sell a ho-
mogeneous product to a continuum of consumers. Kaneko assumes that a subset of ﬁrms
and consumers can cooperate by trading the good among themselves. The main result
establishes that the core is empty when there are more than two ﬁrms. Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) consider a Bertrand oligopoly situation with diﬀerentiated products in
which the demand system is Shubik’s (1980) and ﬁrms operate at a constant and identical
marginal and average cost. They study the equilibrium distribution of prices and proﬁts
among cartels and show that a merger of two cartels implies that all the ﬁrms charge
higher prices, and so beneﬁts all the industry. They also prove that these games have a
superadditive property in the sense that a merger of two disjoint cartels results in a joint
after-merger proﬁt for them which is greater than the sum of their pre-merger proﬁts.
For the same model, Huang and Sjöström (2003) provide a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for the non-emptiness of the recursive core5 which requires that the substitutability
parameter must be greater than or equal to some number that depends on the size of
the industry. They conclude that the recursive core is empty when there are more than
ten ﬁrms.
As a counterpart to this lack of interest in the study of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games,
we consider the same model as Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and substantially extend
their results. In order to deﬁne Bertrand oligopoly TU-games, we consider successively
the ,  and -characteristic function as introduced above. As for Cournot oligopoly
TU-games, we show that the  and -characteristic functions lead to the same class of
Bertrand oligopoly TU-games and we prove that the convexity property holds for this class
of games. Then, following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we consider the -characteristic
function where ﬁrms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strate-
gies. For this class of games, we show that the Equal Division Solution belongs to the
core and we provide a suﬃcient condition under which such games are convex. This
ﬁnding generalizes the superadditivity result of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and con-
trasts sharply with the negative core existence results of Kaneko (1978) and Huang and
Sjöström (2003). Note that these properties are also satisﬁed for Cournot oligopoly TU-
games in -characteristic function form.
In non-cooperative game theory, an important distinction between a normal form
Cournot oligopoly game and a normal form Bertrand oligopoly game is that the former has
strategic substitutabilities and the latter has strategic complementarities. Thus, although
Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games are basically diﬀerent in their non-cooperative
4Interval games are introduced by Branzei et al. (2003).
5The worth of a coalition is deﬁned in a recursive procedure applying the core solution concept to a








































0forms, it appears that their cooperative forms have the same core geometrical structure.6
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the
model and some notations. Section 3 establishes that the  and -characteristic func-
tions lead to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games and shows that the convexity
property holds for this class of games. Section 4 proves that the Equal Division Solution
belongs to the core of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form and
provides a suﬃcient condition under which such games are convex. Section 5 gives some
concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider a Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;(Di;Ci)i2N) where N = f1;2;:::;ng
is the ﬁnite set of ﬁrms, Di : Rn
+  ! R, i 2 N, is ﬁrm i’s demand function and
Ci : R+  ! R+, i 2 N, is ﬁrm i’s cost function. Throughout this article, we assume
that:
(a) the demand system is Shubik’s (1980), i.e.










where pj is the price charged by ﬁrm j, V 2 R+ is the intercept of demand
and r 2 R++ is the substitutability parameter.7 The quantity demanded of ﬁrm
i’s brand depends on its own price pi and on the diﬀerence between pi and the
average price in the industry
P
j2N pj=n. This quantity is decreasing with respect
to pi and increasing with respect to pj, j 6= i;
(b) ﬁrms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost, i.e.
8i 2 N; Ci(x) = cx,
where c 2 R+ is ﬁrm i’s marginal and average cost, and x 2 R+ is the quantity
demanded of ﬁrm i’s brand.
Given assumptions (a) and (b), a Bertrand oligopoly situation is summarized by the 4-
tuple (N;V;r;c).
The normal form Bertrand oligopoly game (N;(Xi;i)i2N) associated with the
Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c) is deﬁned as follows:
1. the set of ﬁrms is N = f1;:::;ng;
6The convexity property ensures that the core is the convex combination of the marginal vectors
(Shapley 1971).









































02. for every i 2 N, the individual strategy set is Xi = R+ where pi 2 Xi represents
the price charged by ﬁrm i;
3. the set of strategy proﬁles is XN =
Q
i2N Xi where p = (pi)i2N is a representa-
tive element of XN; for every i 2 N, the individual proﬁt function i : XN  ! R
is deﬁned as
i(p) = Di(p)(pi   c).
As mentioned above, we want to analyze the stability of cartels and the incentive for
merger in Bertrand oligopoly situations. To this end, we have to convert the normal form
Bertrand oligopoly game (N;(Xi;i)i2N) into a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game. This is
the purpose of the following two sections. In the remainder of this section, we recall the
deﬁnition of a TU-game, the deﬁnition of the core and the notion of a convex TU-game.
We denote by 2N the power set of N and call a subset S 2 2N, S 6= ;, a coalition.
The size s = jSj of coalition S is the number of players in S. A TU-game (N;v)
is a set function v : 2N  ! R with the convention that v(;) = 0, which assigns a
number v(S) 2 R to every coalition S 2 2N. The number v(S) is the worth of coalition
S. For a ﬁxed set of players N, we denote by GN the set of TU-games where v is a
representative element of GN.
In a TU-game v 2 GN, every player i 2 N may receive a payoﬀ i 2 R. A vector
 = (1;:::;n) is a payoﬀ vector. We say that a payoﬀ vector  2 Rn is acceptable
if for every coalition S 2 2N,
P
i2S i  v(S), i.e. the payoﬀ vector provides a total
payoﬀ to the members of coalition S that is at least as great as its worth. We say that
a payoﬀ vector  2 Rn is eﬃcient if
P
i2N i = v(N), i.e. the payoﬀ vector provides a
total payoﬀ to all the players that is equal to the worth of the grand coalition N. The




 2 Rn : 8S 2 2N;
X
i2S






Given a payoﬀ vector in the core, the grand coalition can form and distribute its worth
as payoﬀs to its members in such a way that no coalition can contest this sharing by
breaking oﬀ from the grand coalition.
The notion of a convex TU-game is introduced by Shapley (1971) and provides a natural
way to formalize the idea that it is worthwhile for a player to join larger coalitions. A
TU-game v 2 GN is convex if one of the following two equivalent conditions is satisﬁed:
8S;T 2 2N; v(S) + v(T)  v(S [ T) + v(S \ T),
or equivalently,








































0The convexity property means that the marginal contribution of a player to some coalition
increases if the coalition which he joins becomes larger. Thus, the convexity property can
be regarded as a strong incentive for large scale cooperation.
3 Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with pessimistic expec-
tations.
In this section, we convert a normal form Bertrand oligopoly game into a Bertrand
oligopoly TU-game in such a way that every coalition has pessimistic expectations on
its feasible proﬁts. Traditionally, there are two main ways of converting a normal form
game into a cooperative game called game in  and -characteristic function form re-
spectively (Aumann 1959). In the ﬁrst case, the worth of a coalition is obtained by
computing the proﬁt which its members can guarantee themselves regardless of what
outsiders do. In the second case, the worth of a coalition can be derived by computing
the minimal proﬁt such that outsiders can prevent its members from getting more. First,
we show that the  and -characteristic functions are well-deﬁned and lead to the same
class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. This equality between the  and -characteristic
functions is a useful property, as it relieves us of the burden of choosing between the 
and -characteristic functions when describing collusive proﬁts. Then, we prove that the
convexity property holds for this class of games, i.e. when every coalition has pessimistic
expectations on its feasible proﬁts there exists a strong incentive to form the grand coali-
tion.
In order to deﬁne the  and -characteristic functions, we denote by XS =
Q
i2S Xi
the coalition strategy set of coalition S 2 2N and XNnS =
Q
i2NnS Xi the set of
outsiders’ strategy proﬁles for which pS = (pi)i2S and pNnS = (pi)i2NnS are the
representative elements respectively. For every coalition S 2 2N, the coalition proﬁt





Given the normal form Bertrand oligopoly game (N;(Xi;i)i2N), the  and -characteristic












respectively. For a ﬁxed set of ﬁrms N, we denote by GN









































0The following proposition states that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic
function form are well-deﬁned.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N;(Xi;i)i2N) be a normal form Bertrand oligopoly game. Then,
for every coalition S 2 2N, it holds that
v(S) = S(pS;pNnS),
where (pS;pNnS) 2 XS  XNnS is given by






























Proof: Take a coalition S 2 2N. Deﬁne bS : XNnS  ! XS the best reply function of
coalition S as
8pNnS 2 XNnS; 8pS 2 XS; S(bS(pNnS);pNnS)  S(pS;pNnS) (6)




In order to compute the worth v(S) of coalition S, we have to successively solve the
maximization and the minimization problems deﬁned in (3). First, for every pNnS 2 XNnS
consider the proﬁt maximization program of coalition S, i.e.
8pNnS 2 XNnS; max
pS2XS
S(pS;pNnS).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum are




and imply that the unique maximizer bS(pNnS) is given by











Then, given bS(pNnS) 2 XS consider the proﬁt minimization program of the complemen-


















































































which proves (5). By substituting (5) into (7), we deduce that












which proves (4) and completes the proof. 
Proposition 3.1 calls for some comments which will be useful for the sequel.
Remark 3.2
For every coalition S 2 2N, it holds that:




, then by (4) each member i 2 S charges prices equal to
their marginal cost, pi = c, and by (5) the outsiders charge a non-negative average
price,
P
j2NnS pj=(n   s)  0. In this case, coalition S obtains a zero proﬁt,
v(S) = 0.
2. If V > c
 
1 + r(n   s)=n

, then by (4) each member i 2 S charges prices strictly
greater than their marginal cost, pi > c, and by (5) the outsiders charge a zero
average price,
P
j2NnS pj=(n   s) = 0. In this case, coalition S obtains a positive
proﬁt, v(S) > 0.
3. The computation of the worth v(S) is consistent with the fact that the quantity
demanded of ﬁrm i’s brand, i 2 S, is positive since for every i 2 S, Di(p)  0.
By solving successively the minimization and the maximization problems deﬁned in
(2), we can show that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form are
well-deﬁned. The proof is similar to the one for Proposition 3.1, and so it is not detailed.
A useful property is that the  and -characteristic functions lead to the same class of








































0Proposition 3.3 Let (N;(Xi;i)i2N) be a normal form Bertrand oligopoly game. Then,
for every coalition S 2 2N, it holds that
v(S) = v(S).












Then, it remains to show that for every coalition S 2 2N, v(S)  v(S). We distinguish
two cases:
- assume that V  c
 
1 + r(n   s)=n

. It follows from point 1 of Remark 3.2 that for
every i 2 S, pi = c. Hence, for every pNnS 2 XNnS it holds that S(pS;pNnS) = 0.
- assume that V > c
 
1 + r(n   s)=n

. It follows from point 2 of Remark 3.2 that for
every i 2 S, pi > c, and pNnS = 0NnS. Since for every i 2 S, Di is increasing on XNnS
we deduce that for every pNnS 2 XNnS, S(pS;pNnS)  S(pS;0NnS).
In both cases, it holds that
pNnS 2 arg min
pNnS2XNnS
S(pS;pNnS) (8)











which completes the proof. 
Proposition 3.3 implies that outsiders’ strategy proﬁle pNnS that best punishes coalition
S as a ﬁrst mover (-characteristic function) also best punishes S as a second mover
(-characteristic function). Zhao (1999b) obtains a similar result for general TU-games
in which every strategy set is compact, every utility function is continuous, and satisfying
the strong separability condition that requires that the utility function of a coalition S
and each of its members’ utility functions have the same minimizers. We can use Zhao’s
result (1999b) in order to prove Proposition 3.3. First, we compactify the strategy sets
by assuming that for every i 2 N, Xi = [0;p] where p is suﬃciently large so that the








































0it is clear that every individual proﬁt function i is continuous. Finally, since the demand
system is symmetric and ﬁrms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average
cost, we can verify that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games satisfy the strong separability
condition. In this article, in order to be shorter and perfectly rigorous we prefer to give
a constructive proof of Proposition 3.3 without using Zhao’s result (1999b). We deduce
from Proposition 3.3 the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 Let v 2 GN
o and v 2 GN
o be Bertrand oligopoly TU-games associated
with the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c). Then
C(v) = C(v).
Now, we want to prove that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in  or -characteristic
function form are convex. Proposition 3.1 implies that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in
-characteristic function form are symmetric.8 It follows from (4) that the members of a
coalition S 2 2N charge identical prices, i.e. for every i 2 S, there exists ps 2 R+ such
that pi = ps. It follows from (5) that outsiders charge an average price p[n s]=(n   s)
where p[n s] =
P
j2NnS pj. Hence, the worth v(S) depends only on the size s of
coalition S, i.e. there exists a function f : N  ! R such that for every coalition
S 2 2N, it holds that














For a symmetric TU-game v 2 GN for which for every coalition S 2 2N, v(S) = f(s),
condition (1) becomes:
8S 2 2N : s  n   2; f(s + 1)   f(s)  f(s + 2)   f(s + 1) (9)
The following theorem states that the convexity property holds for the class of Bertrand
oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form.
Theorem 3.5 Every Bertrand oligopoly TU-game v 2 GN
o is convex.
Proof: We want to prove (9). Take a coalition S 2 2N of size s such that s  n   2.
First, we distinguish two cases:
- assume that V  c
 
1 + r(n   s   1)=n

. It follows from point 1 of Remark 3.2 that
ps+1 = c.









and it follows from point 2 of Remark 3.2 that p[n s 1] = p[n s 2] = 0.
In both cases, it holds that
(ps+1   c)p[n s 2] = (ps+1   c)p[n s 1] (10)
8A TU-game v 2 G
N is symmetric if there exists a function f : N  ! R such that for every coalition
S 2 2








































0Since ps+2 is the unique maximizer for any coalition of size s+2 and from (10), it holds
that





















































Moreover, since ps is the unique maximizer for any coalition of size s and p[n s] 
p[n s 1], we deduce that








































It follows from the expression of f(s + 1) and (12) that














We conclude from (11) and (13) that


























 f(s + 2)   f(s + 1),








































0The convexity property does not hold in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic
function form when the ﬁrms operate at diﬀerent marginal costs as illustrated in the
following example.
Example 3.6 Consider the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;(ci)i2N) where N =
f1;2;3g, V = 2, r = 5, c1 = 1, c2 = 3 and c3 = 5. For every coalition S 2 2N, the
worth v(S) is given in the following table:
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g
v(S) 0 0 0 3 12 3 12
Note that v(f1;2g)+v(f1;3g) = 15 > 12 = v(f1;2;3g)+v(f1g), and so v 2 GN
o
is not convex. 
When the ﬁrms have diﬀerent marginal costs, Driessen et al. (2010) provide a suﬃcient
condition under which the convexity property holds for Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in
-characteristic function form.
4 Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with rational expecta-
tions
In this section, we question the resorting to the  and -characteristic functions in order
to deﬁne Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. Indeed, the reaction of outsiders to minimize
the proﬁt of a deviating coalition probably implies substantial damages upon themselves.
As in Chander and Tulkens (1997), we consider the alternative blocking rule for which
outsiders choose their strategy individually as a best reply facing the deviating coalition.
Such an equilibrium is called a partial agreement equilibrium and leads to consider the
"partial agreement characteristic function" or, for short, the -characteristic function.
First, we show that the -characteristic function is well-deﬁned and that the associated
core is included in the core associated with the -characteristic function. Then, for this
class of games we prove that the core is non-empty by showing that the Equal Division
Solution belongs to the core and we provide a suﬃcient condition under which such games
are convex.
Given the normal form Bertrand oligopoly game (N;(Xi;i)i2N) and a coalition
S 2 2N, a strategy proﬁle (p
S; ~ pNnS) 2 XS  XNnS is a partial agreement equilibrium
under S if
8pS 2 XS; S(p
S; ~ pNnS)  S(pS; ~ pNnS) (14)
and
8j 2 NnS; 8pj 2 Xj; j(p
S; ~ pNnS)  j(p
S; ~ pNn(S[fjg);pj) (15)











































S; ~ pNnS) 2 XS  XNnS is a partial agreement equilibrium under S.
Throughout this section, in addition to assumptions (a) and (b) we assume that:
(c) the intercept of demand V 2 R+ is strictly greater than the marginal cost c 2 R+.
For every partial agreement equilibrium under S, assumption (c) ensures that the quantity
demanded of every ﬁrm’s brand is non-negative as discussed later.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) study normal form Bertrand oligopoly games with
general coalition structures. A coalition structure P is a partition of the set of ﬁrms
N, i.e. P = fS1;:::;Skg, k 2 f1;:::;ng. An element of a coalition structure, S 2 P,
is called an admissible coalition in P. We denote by (N) the set of coalition
structures on N. We introduce a binary relation F on (N) deﬁned as follows: we
say that a coalition structure P0 2 (N) is ﬁner than a coalition structure P 2 (N)
(or P is coarser than P0) which we write P F P0 if for every admissible coalition S in
P0 there exists an admissible coalition T in P such that T  S. Note that ((N);F)
is a complete lattice.
Given P 2 (N), the normal form Bertrand oligopoly game (P;(XS;S)S2P) associated
with the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c) is deﬁned as follows:
1. the set of players (or admissible coalitions) is P;
2. for every S 2 P, the coalition strategy set is XS =
Q
i2S Xi;
3. for every S 2 P, the coalition proﬁt function is S =
P
i2S i.
The following proposition is a compilation of diﬀerent results in Deneckere and David-
son (1985).
Proposition 4.1 (Deneckere and Davidson 1985)
- Let P 2 (N) be a coalition structure and let (P;(XS;S)S2P) be the associated
normal form Bertrand oligopoly game. Then,
1. there exists a unique Nash equilibrium p 2 XN such that
8S 2 P; 9pS 2 R+ : 8i 2 S; p
i = pS.
2. it holds that
8S;T 2 P : s  t; pS  pT,








































0- Let P;P0 2 (N) be two coalition structures such that P F P0. Let p 2 XN and
p 2 XN be the unique Nash equilibria of the normal form Bertrand oligopoly games
(P;(XS;S)S2P) and (P0;(XS;S)S2P0) respectively. Then,
3. it holds that for every i 2 N, p
i  p
i .
Point 1 of Proposition 4.1 establishes the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for every
normal form Bertrand oligopoly game (P;(XS;S)S2P) and stipulates that the members
of an admissible coalition S 2 P charge identical prices. Point 2 of Proposition 4.1 char-
acterizes the distribution of prices within a coalition structure and states that if the size
t of an admissible coalition T 2 P is greater than or equal to the size s of an admissible
coalition S 2 P, then the ﬁrms in T charge higher prices than the ﬁrms in S. Point 3 of
Proposition 4.1 analyses the variations in equilibrium prices according to the coarseness
of the coalition structure and speciﬁes that all the ﬁrms charge higher prices when the
coalition structure becomes coarser.
The following proposition states that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic
function form are well-deﬁned.
Proposition 4.2 Let (N;(Xi;i)i2N) be a normal form Bertrand oligopoly game. Then,
for every coalition S 2 2N, there exists a unique partial agreement equilibrium under S.
Proof: Take a coalition S 2 2N and consider the coalition structure PS = fSg [
ffjg : j 2 NnSg. It follows from (14) and (15) that a strategy proﬁle (p
S; ~ pNnS) 2
XS  XNnS is a partial agreement equilibrium for the normal form Bertrand oligopoly
game (N;(Xi;i)i2N) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium for the normal form Bertrand
oligopoly game (PS;(XT;T)T2PS). By point 1 of Proposition 4.1 we conclude that
there exists a unique partial agreement equilibrium under S. 
By solving the maximization problems derived from (14) and (15), the unique partial
agreement equilibrium under S, (p
S; ~ pNnS) 2 XS  XNnS, is given by









2n + r(n + s   1)
 
n + r(n   s)

  r2s(n   s)
+ c (16)
and
8j 2 NnS; ~ pj =
(V   c)
 





2n + r(n + s   1)
 
n + r(n   s)

  r2s(n   s)
+ c (17)
When c = 0, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) provide equivalent expressions of (16) and
(17). We deduce from (16) and (17) that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic
function form are symmetric. It follows from (16) that the members of a coalition S 2 2N
charge identical prices, i.e. for every i 2 S, there exists ps 2 R+ such that p
i = ps.








































0exists ~ ps 2 R+ such that ~ pj = ~ ps. Hence, the worth v(S) depends only on the size
s of coalition S, i.e. there exists a function f : N  ! R such that for every coalition
S 2 2N, it holds that
v(S) = f(s) = s(ps   c)

V   ps + r
(n   s)
n
(~ ps   ps)

.
With these notations in mind, Proposition 4.1 calls for some comments which will be
useful for the sequel.
Remark 4.3
1. For every coalition S 2 2N, we deduce from point 2 of Proposition 4.1 that
ps  ~ ps, i.e. the members of coalition S charge higher prices than the out-
siders.
2. For every coalition S;T 2 2N such that S  T, it follows from point 3 of Propo-
sition 4.1 that ps  pt and ~ ps  ~ pt.
3. For every coalition S 2 2N, let (p
S; ~ pNnS) 2 XS  XNnS be the unique partial
agreement equilibrium under S. If ps > c and ~ ps > c then for every i 2 N,
Di(p
S; ~ pNnS)  0. In order to prove this result, for the sake of contradiction,
assume that there exists i 2 N such that Di(p
S; ~ pNnS) < 0, and ps > c and
~ ps > c. We distinguish two cases:
- if i 2 S then we deduce from point 1 of Proposition 4.1 that for every j 2 S,
Dj(p
S; ~ pNnS) = Di(p
S; ~ pNnS) < 0. Hence, it follows from ps > c that coalition
S obtains a negative proﬁt.
- if i 2 NnS then it follows from ~ ps > c that outsider i obtains a negative proﬁt.
In both cases, since coalition S or every outsider can guarantee a non-negative
proﬁt by charging ps = c or ~ ps = c respectively, we conclude that (p
S; ~ pNnS) 2
XS  XNnS is not a partial agreement equilibrium under S, a contradiction.
By (16) and (17), note that ps > c and ~ ps > c is satisﬁed if and only if V >
c, which corresponds to assumption (c). Thus, assumption (c) ensures that the
quantity demanded of every ﬁrm’s brand is non-negative.
The following proposition states that the core associated with the -characteristic
function is included in the core associated with the -characteristic function.9
Proposition 4.4 Let v 2 GN
o and v 2 GN
o be Bertrand oligopoly TU-games associated
with the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c). Then
C(v)  C(v).
9Chander and Tulkens (1997) obtain this result for TU-games derived from an economy with multi-
lateral environmental externalities. Although their result can be easily generalized to general TU-games,








































0Proof: By the deﬁnition of the core, we have to show that for every coalition S 2

















which completes the proof. 
Proposition 4.4 is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.5 Consider the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c) where N = f1;2;3g,
V = 5, r = 2 and c = 1. For every coalition S 2 2N, the worths v(S) and v(S) are
given in the following table:
s 1 2 3
f(s) 0:76 3:33 12
f(s) 3:36 7:05 12
It follows that the cores C(v) and C(v) are given by
C(v) =

 2 R3 :
X
i2N






 2 R3 :
X
i2N
i = 12 and 8i 2 f1;2;3g; 3:36  i  4:95

.



























































Thus, from the Bertrand oligopoly TU-game v 2 GN
o to the Bertrand oligopoly TU-
game v 2 GN
o , we see that the core is substantially reduced. Two features must be
noticed. The ﬁrst is that the payoﬀ vector (4;4;4) 2 R3 that distributes the worth of
the grand coalition equally among the players is the center of gravity of both cores. The
second is that the Bertrand oligopoly TU-game v 2 GN
o is convex. In the remainder
of this section, we show that these properties hold for some class of Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games. 
Now, we show that a single-valued allocation rule,10 the Equal Division Solution,
belongs to the core of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form.
For every TU-game v 2 GN the Equal Division Solution denoted by ED(v) is deﬁned
as




The Equal Division Solution distributes the worth of the grand coalition equally among the
players. In order to prove that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function
form have a non-empty core, we show that the Equal Division Solution belongs to the
core as enunciated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6 Let v 2 GN
o be a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game. Then ED(v) 2 C(v).
10A single-valued allocation rule on G
N is a mapping  : G
N  ! R
n that associates to every TU-game
v 2 G









































0Proof: In order to prove that ED(v) 2 C(v), we have to show that for every coalition
S 2 2N, v(N)=n  v(S)=s. First, it follows from (16) that pn = (V + c)=2. Then,






= (pn   c)(V   pn)   (ps   c)

V   ps + r
(n   s)
n
(~ ps   ps)

 (pn   c)(V   pn)   (ps   c)(V   ps)
= (pn   ps)(V + c   pn   ps)
 (pn   ps)(V + c   2pn)
= (pn   ps)(V + c   V   c)
= 0,
which completes the proof. 
Then, we provide a suﬃcient condition under which Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in
-characteristic function form are convex. For any v 2 GN
o , this condition is deﬁned as:
8s  n   2;
(s + 2)(n   s   2)~ ps+2 + s(n   s)~ ps + 2ps+1
2(s + 1)(n   s   1)
 ~ ps+1 (18)
By noting that (s + 2)(n   s   2) + s(n   s) + 2 = 2(s + 1)(n   s   1), condition (18)
means that the convex combination of ~ ps+2, ~ ps and ps+1 must be greater than or equal
to ~ ps+1. It follows from point 1 of Remark 4.3 that ps+1  ~ ps+1. It follows from point
2 of Remark 4.3 that ~ ps+2  ~ ps+1  ~ ps. Hence, condition (18) holds if the diﬀerence
between ~ ps+1 and ~ ps is suﬃciently small. For instance, condition (18) is satisﬁed in
Example 4.5.
Theorem 4.7 Let v 2 GN
o be a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game such that condition (18)
is satisﬁed. Then v is convex.
Proof: We want to prove (9), i.e. f(s + 2) + f(s)  2f(s + 1). Take a coalition
S 2 2N of size s such that s  n   2. Since ps+2 is the unique maximizer for any
coalition of size s + 2, it holds that
f(s + 2) = (s + 2)(ps+2   c)

V   ps+2 + r
(n   s   2)
n
(~ ps+2   ps+2)

 (s + 2)(ps+1   c)

V   ps+1 + r
(n   s   2)
n
(~ ps+2   ps+1)

.
Similarly, since ps is the unique maximizer for any coalition of size s, it holds that
f(s) = s(ps   c)

V   ps + r
(n   s)
n
(~ ps   ps)

 s(ps+1   c)

V   ps+1 + r
(n   s)
n










































0For notational convenience, for all s  n   2, we denote by A(s) = (s + 2)(n   s  
2)~ ps+2 + s(n   s)~ ps + 2ps+1, and so condition (18) becomes
8s  n   2; A(s)  2(s + 1)(n   s   1)~ ps+1 (19)
By the above two inequalities and (19) it holds that
f(s + 2) + f(s)  (ps+1   c)





A(s)   2(s + 1)(n   s   1)ps+1
 (ps+1   c)





2(s + 1)(n   s   1)(~ ps+1   ps+1)


= 2(s + 1)(ps+1   c)

V   ps+1 + r
(n   s   1)
n
(~ ps+1   ps+1)

= 2f(s + 1),
which completes the proof. 
Note that condition (18) is not necessary for the convexity property as illustrated in the
following example.
Example 4.8 Consider the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r;c) where N = f1;2;3;4g,
V = 5, r = 6 and c = 0. For every coalition S 2 2N, the worth v(S) is given in the
following table:
s 1 2 3 4
f(s) 3:25 6:96 12:58 25
Although v 2 GN
o is convex, condition (18) does not hold for s = 2 since A(2) 2(2+
1)(n   2   1)~ p2+1 =  0:03 where A(s) is deﬁned as in the proof of Theorem 4.7. 
5 Concluding remarks
In this article, we have focused on Bertrand oligopoly situations where the demand system
is Shubik’s (1980) and ﬁrms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average
cost. In order to deﬁne Bertrand oligopoly TU-games we have considered successively
the ,  and -characteristic functions and we have showed that these functions are
well-deﬁned. The ﬁrst two are suggested by Aumann (1959) and the last one is proposed
by Chander and Tulkens (1997). First, we have showed that the  and -characteristic
functions lead to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. Moreover, we have
proved that the convexity property holds for this class of games. Then, for the class of
Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in -characteristic function form, we have showed that the
Equal Division Solution belongs to the core and we have provided a suﬃcient condition








































0of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and contrasts sharply with the negative core existence
results of Kaneko (1978) and Huang and Sjöström (2003). Thus, although Cournot and
Bertrand oligopoly games are basically diﬀerent in their non-cooperative forms, it appears
that their cooperative forms have the same core geometrical structure. Hence, it follows
from the convexity property that there exists a strong incentive for large scale cooperation
in such games.
We have directly assumed that products are diﬀerentiated. Two other cases can be con-
sidered: when products are unrelated (r = 0) and when products are perfect substitutes
(r = +1).
In the ﬁrst case, the quantity demanded of ﬁrm i’s brand only depends on its own price.
Hence, the proﬁt of a coalition does not depend on outsiders’ behavior, and so the ,
 and -characteristic functions are equal. Moreover, for every coalition S 2 2N, the
coalition proﬁt function S is separable, i.e.




Thus, for every coalition S 2 2N the unique Nash equilibrium p 2 XN of the normal form
Bertrand oligopoly game (N;(Xi;i)i2N) is also the unique partial agreement equilibrium
under S. Hence, Bertrand oligopoly TU-games are additive,11 and so (v(fig))i2N 2 Rn
is the unique core element.
In the second case, ﬁrms sell a homogeneous product. It follows that ﬁrm i’s quantity
demanded is positive if and only if it charges the smallest price. Since ﬁrms operate at
a constant and identical marginal and average cost, for every coalition S 2 2NnfNg,
outsiders charge prices equal to their marginal cost,12 and so coalition S obtains a zero
proﬁt. By charging the monopoly price, the grand coalition obtains a non-negative proﬁt,
and we conclude that the core is equal to the set of imputations.
Other alternative blocking rules can be considered. For instance, ﬁrms in NnS can
choose coalitional rather than individual best reply strategies. In this case, the worth of
coalition S is given by the unique Nash equilibrium of the normal form Bertrand duopoly
game (fS;NnSg;(XT;T)T2fS;NnSg). However, the following example shows that the
non-emptiness of the core crucially depends on the substitutability parameter.
Example 5.1 Consider the two Bertrand oligopoly situations (N;V;r1;c) and (N;V;r2;c)
where N = f1;2;3;4g, V = 1, r1 = 1, r2 = 3 and c = 0. The two Bertrand oligopoly
TU-games associated with the Bertrand oligopoly situations (N;V;r1;c) and (N;V;r2;c)
are symmetric, and so the worths of every coalition S 2 2N are summarized by the func-
tions fr1 : N  ! R and fr2 : N  ! R respectively. The worths of every coalition
S 2 2N are given in the following table:
s 1 2 3 4
fr1(s) 0:252 0:480 0:719 1
fr2(s) 0:242 0:408 0:622 1
11A TU-game v 2 G












































0For the Bertrand oligopoly TU-game associated with the Bertrand oligopoly situation
(N;V;r1;c), we have 4fr1(1) = 1:008 > 1 = fr1(4), and so the core is empty. For
the one associated with the Bertrand oligopoly situation (N;V;r2;c), the payoﬀ vector
(0:25;0:25;0:25;0:25) 2 R4 is a core element, and so the core is non-empty. 
According to Example 5.1, it is easier to obtain a non-empty core when the substitutability
parameter increases. A similar argument is used by Huang and Sjöström (2003) in order
to guarantee the non-emptiness of the recursive core. They prove that the recursive core
is non-empty if and only if the substitutability parameter is greater than or equal to some
number that depends on the size of the industry. When ﬁrms in NnS choose coalitional
best reply strategies, we expect that a similar condition would ensure the non-emptiness
of the core. This is left for future work.
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